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Banks and the World's Major Banking Centers, 2000 
 
Abstract 
We update two earlier articles on the determinants of interpenetration of financial 
centers by banks.  We add the year 2000 to analyses for 1970, 1980 and 1990, which 
enables us to document and analyze the substantial changes that have occurred between 
1990 and 2000.  First, the number of banks and the number of offices in other centers has 
fallen by over 20% since 1990.  Second, despite this aggregate interconnectedness has 
held steady between 1990 and 2000, though there is an increasing asymmetry.  Third, 
Tokyo has lost rank as a center while Hong Kong and Singapore have continued to gain 
importance.  Fourth, Frankfurt, rather than gaining importance with the advent of the 
€uro has apparently lost importance.  Lastly, some explicit or implicit agreements 
between banks from different countries not to compete in each other’s markets have 
continued to wane though intra-European interpenetration remains relatively low. 
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I. Introduction 
This update of the articles by Choi et al., (1986) and Choi et al., (1996) on the 
determinants of interpenetration of financial centers by banks reveals that after some 30 
years of growth in the number of foreign banks in major financial centers (Schenk 2002), 
the number is now dropping.  This is clearly visible in Figure 1, which graphs the number 
of foreign banks in London, New York and Tokyo.  Reasons include mergers among 
large banks that enable the banks to consolidate their operations in particular centers and 
the ongoing weakness of the Japanese economy that has resulted in bank consolidation, 
retreat from abroad, and poor prospects for profitability for foreign banks in Tokyo. 
As Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) and Buch and Delong (2001) show, much of the 
consolidation in banking is taking place within countries, rather than across countries.  
This reduces the number of banks with a headquarters in one of our centers via two 
mechanisms.  First, often the merging banks are headquartered in the same city.  For 
instance, Chase Manhattan Bank, Manufacturers Hanover and Chemical Bank were all 
headquartered in New York and were all part of the data in the previous papers.  Two 
mergers in the 1990s resulted in the three becoming one bank.  Second, sometimes a 
merger results in a shift of the headquarters out of one of our centers.  In 2000, Royal   4
Bank of Scotland, with its headquarters in Edinburgh, acquired National Westminster 
Bank, which had its headquarters in London. 
Adding an analysis of the data for the year 2000 to the analyses for 1970, 1980 
and 1990 enables us to continue to track the evolution of the centers and the behavior of 
the banks that come from these centers.  The replication of the earlier work by essentially 
the same researchers using the same methods and models provides a consistency that 
makes comparison of the results over time more meaningful.  The exercise is worthwhile 
because scholarly interest in financial centers continues unabated.   
Tschoegl’s (2000) review of the literature covers much of what has appeared until 
the late 1990s.  However, new articles continue to appear.  Recently Gehrig (2000) has 
applied theoretical modeling to the area to formalize the intuition of the extant qualitative 
and inductive accounts.  Deida and Fattouh (2000) develop a theoretical model of the 
emergence and growth of financial centers that they test on data for Hong Kong.  The key 
element in their study is a center’s ability to offer foreign investors a higher return on 
their savings than they can achieve in their home markets due to economies of scale in 
financial intermediation.  Fattouh (2000) argues that banks locate in a center to gain 
access to the center’s financial markets and to benefit from the various externalities that 
the center generates such as access to more liquid inter-bank markets, specialized 
intermediate inputs, and a highly skilled labor force.  Grote, Lo and Harrschar-Ehrnborg 
(2002) examine the value chain for three different financial services (advisory, lending 
and trading), and argue that the new information and communication technologies may 
result in new spatial configurations of activities.   
   5
II. Data 
We define interpenetration as the exchange of organizational presence.  We begin 
by updating the matrices in Choi et al., (1986) and Choi et al., (1996) for the year 2000.  
We use the same fourteen centers: London (LO), New York (NY), Paris (PA), 
Frankfurt/Hamburg (FH), Tokyo (TO), Singapore (SI), Hong Kong (HK), Los 
Angeles/San Francisco (LS), Zurich/Geneva (ZG), Amsterdam (AM), Brussels (BR), 
Panama (PN), Milan/Rome (MR) and Toronto/Montreal (TM).  These centers then are 
the basis for a To/From (henceforth TOFROM) matrix (Table 1).  The diagonal elements 
(Yii; i = 1...14) are the number of banks in the world’s Top 300 (The Banker) with 
headquarters in the respective centers.  Panama has no bank in the Top 300 so we used 
the largest bank.  The off-diagonal elements (Yij; i≠j) enumerate the number of banks 
from one center (center i) that have a presence (representative office, agency, branch, 
subsidiary or Edge Act subsidiary) in the other center (center j).  We do not distinguish 
between representative offices, agencies, branches or subsidiaries but merely enumerate a 
presence, regardless of legal form, though we fully recognize that the different forms 
represent commitments to different product markets (Heinkel and Levi 1992).   
Table 2 presents the ranks of each center for 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000.  The 
basis for the ranking is the sum of the columns in Table 1.  The rank reflects how many 
banks of those in the sample have representation in the center in question.  We also 
measure the “centrality” of each center, which we calculate by the proportion of centers 
that have at least one of their banks with representation in the center in question. 
Centrality takes on a value of 1 (i.e., 13/13) if all other centers have representation in the 
center in question, and 0 if none do (i.e., 0/13).     6
We may see that for 2000, NY is again first and London second.  Obviously this 
contradicts the evidence in Figure 1; clearly London is better at drawing banks from 
outside our 14 centers and from below the Top 300 than is New York.  Tokyo has 
dropped noticeably from third to fifth place, its poorest showing since 1970.  With Japan 
having endured a waterlogged economy for over a decade, many banks have found too 
little business in Tokyo to warrant their remaining there.  By contrast, Hong Kong and 
Singapore have continued the climb that was already visible in 1990.  What our data 
cannot capture, however, is the rising importance of Shanghai as a center for China, or 
the increasing role of other national centers such as Seoul, Taipei and Kuala Lumpur.  
Most importantly, Shanghai may well return to the primacy over Hong Kong that it 
enjoyed between the World Wars, at least with respect to the presence of banks.  
(Shanghai still suffers from extensive restrictions on the banks’ activities, exchange 
controls and political risk.  Thus Hong Kong will continue to see considerable business 
being transacted. ) 
What continues to make New York the most central of our centers is the presence 
of a branch of the Banco Nacional de Panama.  London’s centrality remained unchanged 
at 0.92 relative to its value in 1990, and Los Angeles-San Francisco rose sharply to the 
same level.  This may reflect the fact that California would rank as the world’s fifth 
largest economy, if it were a separate nation.  Most of the other centers lost centrality.  
This last is a consequence of banks retreating from unprofitable centers.  What is perhaps 
most striking is the fall in Frankfurt’s centrality; Frankfurt is the only one of the 14 
centers to have a lower centrality in 2000 than it had in 1970.  This has occurred despite 
the arrival of the €uro and the choice of Frankfurt as the home for the European Central   7
Bank.  Interestingly, Panama has retained its centrality, suggesting that Miami is not yet a 
perfect substitute as a center for Central America and Northern South America. 
 
III. Interconnectedness 
Clearly, the amount of interconnectedness increased substantially between 1970 
and 1980, only slightly between 1980 and 1990, and has fallen slightly between 1990 and 
2000.  The number of banks represented in the TOFROM matrix fell 24% from 100 in 
1990 to 76 in 2000 and the sum of the off-diagonal cells fell 22% from 491 in 1990 to 
381 in 2000 (Table 3).  However, the average number of links per bank increased 
marginally from 4.9 in 1990 to 5.0 in 2000.  As a result, the density of the matrix 
increased very slightly. 
Although the proportion of one-way links has not changed since 1990, the 
proportion of two-way links has fallen to below the level pertaining in 1970. As a result 
the ratio of actual to potential links has eased slightly.   
Lastly, the 2000 TOFROM matrix reflects extensive changes at the level of 
individual cells.  The sum of the squared cell-by-cell differences between the 1980 and 
1970 matrices the total is 1365.  The sum of the squared differences between the 1990 
and the 1980 matrices is 613.  The sum of the squared differences between the 2000 and 
the 1990 matrices is 1280.  The 1990-2000 period thus was more turbulent than the 1980-
1990 period, though slightly less turbulent than the 1970-1980 period.  However, in the 
1970-80 period the turbulence derived from expansion whereas in the 1990-2000 period 
it derived from contraction.  Most of this contraction came from the banks in two centers: 
Tokyo and NY.     8
The FROM Tokyo row of the matrix accounts for 46% of the sum of squared 
differences and the FROM NY row accounts for 28%.  In both cases the differences 
include declines in the number of banks headquartered in the two cities as well as 
consolidation of presence abroad.  The number of banks headquartered in Tokyo fell 30% 
from 20 in 1990 to 14 in 2000.  For New York the corresponding numbers are eight and 
four, for a 50% reduction.  The number of presences in other centers declined 56% and 
57% for Tokyo and New York.  The largest percentage decline in presences abroad, 
however, involves Los Angeles-San Francisco.  In 1998, Nations Bank, headquartered in 
Charlotte, North Carolina, acquired Bank of America, which had its headquarters in San 
Francisco.  This removed Bank of America and its extensive network of overseas offices 
from our matrix.  At the same time, Wells Fargo Bank, also cut back its offices abroad, 
preferring instead to work through an alliance with HSBC. 
What all this suggests is a hypothesis of an increasing asymmetry.  Each of the 
surviving largest banks, which tend to come from the larger countries and to be 
headquartered in the larger centers, may have slightly extended its penetration or 
equivalently further filled out its network, though as a group they are less numerous than 
in the past.  At the same time, the smaller banks, which tend to come from the smaller 
countries and the smaller centers may have rationalized their presence abroad. 
In terms of declines in the number of presences of foreign banks, the largest 
declines were in Frankfurt-Hamburg (50%), Toronto-Montreal (50%), Paris (49%), 
Tokyo (42%), London (40%), Milan-Rome (38%) and Zurich-Geneva (38%).  This list 
includes both what were or are top-tier centers, i.e., Tokyo and London, and centers that 
are redundant in the sense that a bank with a presence in any one of them or in a nearby   9
center could serve its clients from there.  Thus a bank can service Canada from New 
York, or any of the European centers from London, or any other center in the €uro zone. 
 
IV. The Determinants of Interpenetration 
The underlying structure of the models we use is that of the gravity model of 
international trade in goods. Deardorff (1998, 12) has argued that, “any plausible model 
of trade would yield something very like the gravity equation, whose empirical success is 
therefore not evidence of anything, but just a fact of life.”  More recently, Evenett and 
Keller (2002) have shown that the modeling accuracy of gravity models exceeds that 
attributable to Heckscher-Ohlin and Riccardian theories.  Our models are also consistent 
with micro-economic approaches to foreign direct investment in banking.  There the 
underlying model is a profit function with banks establishing themselves in foreign 
locations when it is profitable to do so.  Lastly, our models incorporate considerations of 
rivalry between and collusion among firms as factors in the foreign direct investment 
decision.  
 
Statistical techniques and the dependent variable 
As in the two earlier studies we use both ordinary least squares (OLS) and non-
linear weighted least squares (NLWLS).  For the OLS regressions the dependent variable 
is the Box-Cox (1964) transform of Yij with λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0.5.  We use two techniques 
(OLS and NLWLS) with different assumptions and estimation methods to check that our 
results are not sensitive to our choice of method.  For fuller descriptions of the models, 
variables and estimation techniques we use we refer the reader to the earlier articles.   10
 
Centers as destinations 
We use two variables—TO and CGNP—to operationalize the attractiveness of the 
destination centers.  TOj = Y.j - Yij; the variable measures the number of banks from 
centers other than i that are in j.  The logic behind TO is that the number of banks in a 
center is a signal both of the demand for bank services there and of the center’s 
attractiveness as an interbank market.  In the estimation of Model III, the elements of TO 
are the fitted values based on a first pass regression of Yij on the exogenous variables.  
We used this two-stage approach to reduce any simultaneity problems.  We calculate 
CGNPi, the GNP of center i, by multiplying the population of the city or city-pair by the 
national GNP per capita in US dollars.  The variable also proxies for investment and 
trade flows between the areas the centers serve.  Like lagged dependent variables in time 
series regressions, TO adds more to statistical fit than to economic explanation.  It 
subsumes the effects of legal and regulatory regimes, the size of the economic area, 
agglomeration effects, and so forth.  CGNP has more economic content but provides too 
narrow an explanation.  Because both variables have their limitations we use them as 
alternatives. 
 
Centers as sources 
FROM represents the capacity of the banks headquartered in a source center to 
establish offices abroad.  FROMi  = Yii; that is, we draw the elements of the variable from 
the main diagonal of our TOFROM matrix.  Given our measures, a center cannot 
establish more offices in another center than the source center has banks.     11
 
Obstacles or costs and strategic considerations 
The major potential obstacle in the models is the distance between centers.  We 
measure this by DISTij, the airline distance between the centers.  Airline distance is only 
roughly representative of the costs of operating far from headquarters.  Still, in our case it 
correlates roughly with time-zone differences that complicate communications.  Airline 
distance also correlates, arguably, with cultural distance.  Furthermore, physical distance 
may have an indirect effect on interconnectedness in banking through its (negative) effect 
on trade volumes and hence on the demand for trade financing (Heinkel and Levi 
1992). 
JPN is a (0,1) dummy variable for those cases where Tokyo is the source center. 
Prior to 1982 the Ministry of Finance discouraged or at least slowed the international 
expansion of Japan’s banks.  After 1982, the Ministry of Finance progressively reduced 
its restrictions.  Since the collapse of the bubble economy at the end of 1989, Japanese 
banks have been curtailing their international activities (Williams 1996; Peek and 
Rosengren 2000).  
The first variable representing strategic behavior is Yji, the reverse of the flow to 
Yij.  The variable proxies for mutual forbearance vs. actual or potential retaliation.  In the 
estimations the elements of Yji are fitted values from a first pass regression of Yij on the 
exogenous variables.  That is, the variable captures whether the number of banks in 
Center i from Center j is a function of the number of banks from j in i. 
The second variable for strategic behavior is a nationality dummy for Swiss 
banks.  Swiss banks have historically had few foreign branches and subsidiaries despite   12
the extent of their international involvement.  SWISS is a (0,1) dummy variable that takes 
on a value of 1 when Yij represents a flow from Zurich or Geneva to any one of the 
following five centers: Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Frankfurt/Hamburg, or Milan/Rome.  
The third variable representing strategic behavior is a (0,1) dummy for intra-
European pairs of centers.  The variable reflects two opposing influences.  First, in 1973 
the EEC adopted the freedom of establishment provisions of the First Banking 
Coordination Directive and then in 1989 it adopted the single European banking license 
provisions of the Second Banking Coordination Directive.  These would suggest that the 
coefficient for EURO should be negative in 1970, i.e., before liberalization, zero or 
positive in 1980 and 1990, with the coefficient being slightly larger in 1990 than 1980, 
and with more time having elapsed, strongly positive in 2000.  However, historically, the 
European banks joined banking clubs that may have operated to reduce interpenetration 
by European banks of their partners’ home markets (Ross 2002).  EURO takes on a value 
of 1 when Yij represents a flow between any two of the following five centers: Paris, 
Brussels, Amsterdam, Frankfurt/Hamburg, or Milan/Rome.  
The last of our variables for strategic behavior is FHZG.  This is a (0,1) dummy 
variable that takes on a value of 1 whenever Yij represents a flow between Zurich/Geneva 
on the one hand and Frankfurt/Hamburg on the other.  Although the Swiss banks did not 
join the European banking clubs, there is anecdotal evidence that they engaged in mutual 
forbearance pacts with the major German banks.  We do not include the variable in the 
NLWLS regressions because including it frequently prevented convergence in the 
estimating algorithms in the earlier studies. 
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V. Results: Variables 
Table 4 presents the OLS and NLWLS results for Model I (the simple gravity 
model) for all four years: 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000.  In both the OLS and NLWLS 
estimations the models are slightly weaker in 2000 than in 1990, reflecting the reduced 
number of banks and presences.  The coefficients for TO and FROM are similar in size to 
each other within an estimation method.  This is consistent with the symmetry 
assumption inherent in gravity models (Theil 1979).  They are also similar in magnitude 
to their values in 1990.  The one noticeable change is that for 2000 the coefficient of 
DIST is negative and large relative to its value in previous years.  One probable factor is 
the reduced number of banks from Japan and the reduction in the number of their offices 
in New York and London.  The coefficient may also reflect banks in general having 
reconsidered the value of distant offices that have little function. 
Tables 5 (OLS) and 6 (NLWLS) present the results for Models II and III.  Models 
II and III augment Model I with the explanatory variables we discussed in Section IV. 
The difference between the models is that Model II uses CGNP as the variable 
representing the attractiveness of a center and Model III uses TO. 
In Models II and III for the OLS and the NLWLS estimations, the coefficients for 
CGNP in 2000 are similar with those for 1990.  However, the magnitude of TO in 2000 is 
smaller.  Still, the results suggest that whether we use TO or CGNP makes little 
difference to our overall goodness-of-fit.  The coefficient of FROM appears slightly 
greater than in 1990, but not enough so as to mark a notable change.  As in Model I, the 
coefficient of DIST is much larger in 2000 than in 1990, and negative.     14
Next we come to the variables that represent strategic factors.  The first of these is 
JPN, the dummy for Japanese origin.  This coefficient shows that before the relaxation in 
1982 of what Engwall (1992) has called emigration restrictions, Japanese banks opened 
fewer offices abroad than what one would otherwise expect.  By 1990, the year in which 
the “bubble economy” began to burst, the Japanese banks were over-represented.  (The 
banks had rushed abroad in order to benefit from any opportunities arising from the need 
to recycle Japan’s trade surplus and from their strong capital positions based on their 
shareholdings in companies whose shares had appreciated.)  In 2000, after a decade of a 
waterlogged economy, the representation overseas of Japanese banks is in line with 
expectations.  We can think of this as a “Goldilocks” outcome, with the most recent 
outcome being not “too cold” and not “too hot”, but rather “just right.” 
The coefficients of Yji (the backflow variable), show a dramatic change in 
behavior between 1970 and 1980 on the one hand and 1990 and 2000 on the other.  In 
1970 and 1980 the coefficients are generally positive and statistically significant across 
both estimation methods.  In 1990 and 2000, the coefficients are generally small, whether 
positive or negative.  This suggests that the variable may be capturing history rather than 
strategic behavior.  In 1970 and 1980 London and New York were both major 
destinations and major sources, with a number of other centers being much less important 
as either.  By 1990, centers such as Singapore and Hong Kong had risen in importance as 
destinations rather than as sources.  Furthermore, after 1990 Tokyo’s importance as a 
source had grown more rapidly than its importance as a destination.  
The coefficients for SWISS origin are negative across time and methods.  The 
results are consistent with the Swiss reluctance to establish offices in continental Europe   15
that we noted in the earlier articles.  There is some sign that the magnitude of the effect 
has declined in 2000, but that may reflect little more than that the Swiss no longer stand 
out as dramatically now that other sources have cut back their overseas representation. 
The coefficients for EURO, the variable for the links between the (non-Swiss) 
continental European banks remain negative.  Because of the inconsistencies in the 
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients in the OLS and NLWLS estimations, one would 
be hard put to make a strong case that the effect is smaller in 2000 than in earlier years.  
This suggests that some implicit cooperation (i.e., non-aggression pacts) continues. 
The coefficients of FHZG, the variable for mutual forbearance between Swiss and 
German banks, has turned mildly positive in 2000.  As the earlier papers forecast, the 
détente, if any, has broken down.   
 
VI. Results: Centers as Sources and Destinations 
Table 7 compares the actual marginal totals for 2000 from Table 1 with the 
estimated marginal totals based on the cell frequencies from Model III.  All marginal 
totals use only on the off-diagonal cells.  The Source columns in Table 7 therefore show 
which centers have established more or fewer interconnections than we would expect 
from our models. The Destination column shows which centers have received more or 
fewer interconnections than we would expect from our model.  The mean squared error 
for the difference between the actual and estimated marginal totals suggest that the model 
is better at accounting for sources than destinations.   
As far as source centers is concerned, the model over-predicts the number of 
offices emanating from Hong Kong and underestimates the number emanating from   16
Amsterdam-Rotterdam.  In 1991, HSBC relocated its headquarters from Hong Kong to 
London, removing from Hong Kong the headquarters its largest and most international 
bank.  By contrast, the Netherlands is the home of ABN-AMRO Bank and ING Bank.  
ABN-AMRO has at its core Algemene Bank Nederland, which traces its ancestry back to 
1827 and the Nederlands Handel-Maatschappij (Netherlands Trading Company), and is 
an extremely international bank.  Though significantly newer in its international 
activities, ING has been expanding aggressively abroad. 
That said, the only two large errors are underestimates of the number of banks 
coming to Singapore and Hong Kong.  Both of these city-states act as financial centers 
for much larger catchment areas than their own size would suggest.  Also, prior to the 
1997-98 Asian crisis, Southeast and East Asia were fast growing areas. 
 
VII. Summary and Conclusion 
International financial centers and international banks evolve over time. Our 
update of Choi et al., (1986) and Choi et al., (1996) has enabled us to support some of the 
earlier findings and to identify some changes both in the evolution of financial centers 
and in the behavior of the international banks.  
First, aggregate interconnectedness has held steady or even decreased slightly 
between 1990 and 2000 although we had 24% fewer parent banks in our population in 
2000 than in 1990.  We hypothesize that what is happening is that the large banks, which 
tend to come from the large economies and the most important centers, are still filling out 
their networks slightly, while smaller banks from smaller economies and centers are 
rationalizing their networks, and especially their presence in remote centers.   17
Even if the number of foreign banks represented in each center has fallen, the 
depth and breadth of each foreign bank’s presence may well have increased.  Again, one 
source of the reduction in numbers of offices is mergers between the parent banks, 
mergers that should, ceteris paribus, have resulted in a combining of volumes of 
activities.  The foreign banks could also be engaging in a wider range of activities.  
Unfortunately, information on the activities of foreign banks in various centers is even 
sparser than information on the presence of foreign banks.  
Second, between 1990 and 2000, the tiering of centers that had developed earlier 
has become more ambiguous.  London and New York remain in the top tier.  However, 
Asia is now split between three centers—Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo—while the 
European centers have fallen into a third tier.  One might conjecture that the move to the 
€uro may be one factor behind the European centers’ loss of rank.  Now, banks no longer 
need to have several offices in Europe to access separate money markets; instead one 
office within the €uro area suffices.  Frankfurt, which many had expected to rise in 
importance as home of the European Central Bank, saw the largest decline in centrality.  
(The growth of several discount airlines based out of airports around London may also 
have served to reduce the value of offices elsewhere in Europe.)  Zurich-Geneva’s ability 
to retain its rank then may reflect not only its (albeit diminished) role as a safe haven but 
also its retention of an independent currency. 
Third, the number of banks in a center remains a major indicator of the 
attractiveness of a center.  The number of banks in a center reflects both the size of the 
market facing each bank independently of the presence or absence of other banks, and the 
benefits to the banks of being in a central marketplace.    18
Fourth, the Japanese banks are no longer under-represented abroad as they were 
in 1970 and 1980 due to Japanese government restrictions on their international 
expansion.  Nor are they over-represented as they were in 1990.  Now, in 2000, the need 
to reduce unprofitable activities has resulted in a pattern of presences in line with those of 
banks from elsewhere. 
Fifth, any reluctance by the German and Swiss banks to penetrate each other’s 
markets has disappeared.  However, the EU Europeans in general remain under-
represented in each other’s markets.  The Swiss still appear under-represented abroad.  
Finally, the model is slightly better at estimating the number of offices a center 
sends out than at estimating the number of offices going to a center.  That said, banks 
from New York, Amsterdam and Brussels have noticeably more offices abroad than the 
model would predict, and Hong Kong and Singapore have noticeably more offices than 
the model predicts.   19
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LO NY TO HK  SI  FH PA ZG MR LS TM BR AM PN  Σ 
LO  7  4 4 4 3 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 3 2  42 
NY 2  4  3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 1  36 
TO 9 12  14  9  10  2 1 5 1 3 3 3 2 1  75 
HK  2 1 0 4  1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9 
SI 3 1 4 5 5  0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0  22 
FH  5 3 3 5 3 9  3 6 3 3 2 3 2 1  51 
PA  4 5 4 4 5 5 7  4 4 3 3 4 3 2  57 
ZG  2 2 2 3 3 2 3 5  2 2 2 0 1 1  30 
MR  4 4 2 2 3 3 2 0 5  2 0 3 1 0  31 
LS  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2  0 0 0 0 4 
TM  6 6 4 5 6 0 1 2 1 3 6  0 0 1  41 
BR  2 4 1 2 3 1 3 2 3 1 0 4  4 0  30 
AM  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3  1 27 
PN  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  2 
Σ  49 50 43 48 47 30 27 31 26 27 22 25 21 11  457 
Rank  2 1 5 3 4 7 8 6  10  8  12  11  13  14 
Source: Bankers Almanac (2000) 
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Table 2 — The ranking and centrality of the fourteen centers 
Center 1970  1980  1990  2000 
 Rank Cent. Rank Cent. Rank Cent. Rank Cent. 
New York (NY)  2  0.85  1  1.00  2  1.00  1  1.00 
London  (LO)  1 0.77 3 0.92 1 0.92 2 0.92 
Hong Kong (HK)  8  0.69  5  0.92  4  0.92  3  0.85 
Singapore  (SI)  11  0.69 6 0.92 5 0.92 4 0.85 
Tokyo  (TO)  3 0.69 2 0.92 3 0.92 5 0.77 
Zurich/Geneva  (ZG)  11 0.54 12 0.62  8  0.77  6  0.62 
Frankfurt/Hamburg  (FH)  4 0.69 4 0.69 6 0.69 7 0.62 
Paris  (PA)  3 0.69 7 0.77 7 0.77 8 0.69 
Los Angeles/San Francisco (LS)  7  0.69  8  0.77  10  0.77  8  0.92 
Milan/Rome  (MR)  6 0.54 9 0.69 9 0.77  10  0.69 
Brussels  (BR)  10 0.54 11 0.69 12 0.62 11 0.62 
Toronto/ Montreal (TM)  13  0.31  10  0.69  11  0.69  12  0.54 
Amsterdam  (AM)  9  0.54 13 0.62 13 0.69 13 0.62 
Panama  (PN)  14 0.23 14 0.62 14 0.62 14 0.62 
Source: Choi et al., (1986), Choi et al., (1996) and Table 1. 






Table 3 — Measures of the degree of interconnectedness of the centers in 1970, 1980, 1990 
and 2000 














1970 102 187 1.1  78  59  60 
1980 105 444 2.5  91  64  77 
1990 100 491 2.9  93  65  79 
2000 76 381 3.0  93  54  74 
Note: The density is the ratio of the number of off-diagonal presences to the product of 
168 (the number of off-diagonal cells) and the number of banks (i.e., the sum of the 
main diagonal).  It can range in value from 0 (no bank has any off-diagonal presence) to 
1 (every bank has a presence in every center). 
Source: Choi et al., (1986), Choi et al., (1996), and Table 1. 
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Table 4 — OLS and NLWLS estimation of Model I 
 OLS  NLWLS 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Constant  -2.60 -4.28 -3.60 -1.78 -4.10 -4.73 -4.87 -3.48 
 (-5.21)  (-8.68)  (-7.17)  (-3.68)  (-6.69) (-9.49) (-9.77) (-5.88) 
ln TO  0.51 0.76 0.77 0.74 0.91 0.88 0.89 1.05 
  (6.28) (7.86) (7.69) (6.65) (9.63) (14.7) (8.62) (6.93) 
ln FROM  0.57 0.76 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.99 1.14 1.15 
  (10.5) (5.06) (16.3) (11.8) (7.80) (9.61) (17.9) (11.2) 
ln DIST  0.05  0.14  0.02  -0.17  -0.01 0.05 0.05 -0.16 
  1.15  (3.41) (0.69) (-4.80)  (-0.29) (1.41) (1.65) (-4.23) 
          
R
2  0.43 0.60 0.63 0.53         
F  45.4 67.1 99.2 66.7         
SER  0.71 0.64 0.61 0.61         
LR  Statistic        68 258  404  186 
Pseudo R
2        0.09 0.26 0.40 0.25 
Note: The number of observations is 182; t-statistics are in parentheses; R
2 is the coefficient of
  determination; F 
is the F-statistic; SER is the standard error of the regression; Bold face indicates that the coefficient is 
significant at the 5% level on a one-tailed test.  The LR statistic is -2ln(the ratio of the likelihood at convergence 
to the likelihood with all the slope coefficients set to zero) and is distributed as χ
2 with 3 degrees of freedom.  
The pseudo R
2 is 1 minus the ratio of the likelihood at convergence to the likelihood with all the slope 
coefficients set to zero. 
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Table 5 — OLS estimation of Models II and III 
  Model II  Model III 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Constant -0.11  -1.30 -2.75 -2.33 -1.42  -3.20 -3.35 -0.82 
 (-0.19)  (-2.54)  (-3.69)  (-2.97)  (-1.10) (-3.94) (-4.73) (-1.11) 
ln TO       0.38  0.62 0.97 0.49 
       (0.93)  (3.36)  (6.49)  (2.74) 
ln CGNP  -0.12  0.12 0.19 0.19      
  (-1.02)  (2.28)  (5.11)  (4.87)      
ln FROM  0.40 0.76 0.75 0.84 0.50 0.78 0.77 0.86 
  (5.43) (12.8) (12.1) (9.23) (5.84) (13.3) (13.0) (8.94) 
ln DIST  -0.01  0.06  -0.10 -0.22 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 -0.16 
  (-0.15) (0.96) (-2.05) (-4.21) (-1.64) (1.09) (-1.51) (-3.02) 
JPN -0.22  -0.38 0.49 -0.02 -0.15 -0.31 0.61  -0.13 
  (-0.95) (-1.74) (2.35) (-0.09) (-0.65) (-1.44) (3.04) (-0.55) 
ln Yji  0.74 0.22 -0.06 -0.08 -0.29 0.18  0.02 0.00 
 (3.12)  (2.59)  (-0.75)  (-0.82)  (-1.07) (2.34) (0.36) (0.04) 
SWISS -0.36  -0.72 -0.80 -0.63 -0.27  -0.65 -0.66 -0.59 
 (-0.96)  (-2.18)  (-2.56)  (-1.98)  (-0.72) (-2.00) (-2.17) (-1.80) 
EURO -0.21  -0.51 -0.45 -0.18 -0.35  -0.46  -0.25 -0.18 
 (-0.92)  (-2.60)  (-2.46)  (-1.96)  (-1.46) (-2.34) (-1.42) (-0.93) 
FHZG -0.24  -1.11  -0.39 0.35 -0.83 -1.17  -0.55 0.25 
 (-0.39)  (-2.19)  (-0.81)  (0.72)  (-1.27) (-2.35) (-1.19) (0.49) 
          
R
2  0.44 0.60 0.62 0.50 0.44 0.61 0.65 0.46 
F  16.7 32.3 35.6 22.0 16.7 34.2 40.2 18.4 
SER  0.72 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.72 0.64 0.60 0.66 
Note: The number of observations is 182; the t-statistics is in parentheses; R
2 is the coefficient of
  determination; 
F is the F-statistic; SER is the standard error of the regression; Bold face indicates that the coefficient is 
significant at the 5% level on a one-tailed test; underlining (__) of a variable’s name indicates a fitted value from 
a first-pass regression. 
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Table 6 — NLWLS estimation of Models II and III 
  Model II  Model III 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Constant  -1.79 -1.05 -3.46 -3.34 -1.62 -3.30 -4.80 -2.03 
 (-2.29)  (-2.25)  (-4.92)  (-3.83)  (-2.01) (-4.12) (-6.95) (-2.43) 
ln TO       0.55  0.70 1.08 0.47 
       (1.05)  (3.83)  (7.39)  (2.24) 
ln CGNP  -0.03  0.14 0.18 0.18      
  (-0.20)  (2.77)  (4.93)  (4.02)      
ln FROM  0.70 0.83 0.93 1.14 0.79 0.86 0.98 1.17 
  (4.81) (9.91) (11.2) (7.88) (4.85) (10.6) (12.5) (7.83) 
ln DIST  0.04  -0.01  -0.06  -0.16  -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.09 
  (0.46) (-0.24) (-1.35) (-2.93) (-0.17) (0.06) (0.01) (-1.71) 
JPN -0.35  -0.28 0.29 -0.16 -0.24 -0.15 0.40 -0.28 
  (-1.36) (-1.67) (2.10) (-0.78) (-0.91) (-0.96) (3.12) (-1.34) 
ln Yji  1.26 0.24 -0.03 0.07 0.91 0.15 0.06 0.14 
 (4.02)  (3.20)  (-0.36)  (0.64)  (2.47) (1.94) (1.15) (1.25) 
SWISS -0.72  -1.24 -1.18 -0.17 -0.72 -1.17 -0.98 -0.16 
 (-0.56)  (-2.05)  (-2.03)  (-0.94)  (-0.68) (-1.99) (-1.80) (-0.87) 
EURO 0.31  -0.34 -0.43 -0.50 0.16 -0.28 -0.13 -0.46 
  (0.94) (-1.81) (-2.54) (-1.36) (0.46) (-1.54) (-0.78) (-1.22) 
          
LR  Statistic  73 210  383  160 75 218  408  148 
Pseudo R
2 0.10 0.21 0.38 0.22 0.10 0.22 0.40 0.20 
          
Note: The number of observations is 182; asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses; Bold face indicates that the 
coefficient is significant at the 5% level on a one-tailed test; underlining (__) of a variable’s name indicates a 
fitted value from a first-pass regression.  The LR statistic is -2ln(the ratio of the likelihood at convergence to the 
likelihood with all the slope coefficients set to zero) and is distributed as χ
2 with 7 degrees of freedom.  The 
pseudo R
2 is 1 minus the ratio of the likelihood ratio at convergence to the likelihood ratio with all the slope 
coefficients set to zero. 
   29
 
Table 7 — Comparison of actual and estimated totals for the number of foreign banks in a 
center in 2000, based on the cell estimates from Model III (NLWLS) 













New York (NY)  32  12  -63  46  26  -43 
London  (LO)  35 35  0 42 27 -36 
Hong Kong (HK)  5  12  140  44  18  -59 
Singapore  (SI)  17 14 -18  42 17 -60 
Tokyo  (TO)  61 55 -10  29 22 -24 
Zurich/Geneva  (ZG)  25 16 -36  26 24  -8 
Frankfurt/Hamburg  (FH)  42 45  7 21 23 10 
Paris  (PA)  50 32 -36  20 23 15 
Los Angeles/San Francisco (LS)  2  0  -100  25  19  -24 
Milan/Rome  (MR)  26 18 -31  21 22  5 
Brussels  (BR)  26 13 -50  23 20 -13 
Toronto/ Montreal (TM)  35  24  -31  16  18  13 
Amsterdam (AM)  24  9  -63  17  20  18 
Panama (PN)  1  0  -100  10  6  -40 
         
Mean Square Error    107      148   
Error: (Estimate – Actual)/Actual 
 